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1956] RECENT DECISIONS 711 
REGULATION OF BUSINESS-FAIR TRADE ACTS-AVAILABILITY OF INJUNCTION 
AGAINST NoNSIGNER's INDUCING BREACH OF FAIR TRADE AGREEMENT-Plaintiff 
manufacturer had extensive agreements with its distributors under the 
Michigan Fair Trade Act.1 The circuit court enjoined the defendant, who 
was not a party to any of these contracts, from inducing the plaintiff's 
distributors to sell products to the defendant below the agreed fair trade 
price. On appeal, held, reversed, three justices dissenting. Defendant is 
privileged to induce the breach of a fair trade agreement which restricts 
his business opportunities and is contrary to the state's policy against the 
enforcement of the nonsigner provision of its fair trade law. Argus Cameras, 
Inc. v. Hall of Distributors, Inc., 343 Mich. 54, 72 N.W. (2d) 152 (1955). 
The effectiveness of the fair trade acts depends fundamentally upon the 
efficacy of the provision authorizing the fair trader to enforce his designated 
price against nonsigners of fair trade agreements.2 Although the McGuire 
Act3 removed the last barriers to state fair trade acts raised by federal legis-
lation or court decision, some state courts have declared the nonsigner pro-
visions of their acts to be violative of their state constitutions.4 These deci-
sions prevent attempts to enforce the nonsigner's adherence to the fair trade 
price by refusing to enjoin his sales below that price. Having previously de-
clared the nonsigner provision unconstitutional,5 the Michigan court, in the 
principal case, prevents a more indirect enforcement by refusing to enjoin 
the nonsigner's purchases from the fair trader's distributors in interference 
with the latter's contractual relationships. The courts, although in general 
holding a person liable for the damages resulting from his intentional inter-
ference with the contractual relations of another, 6 recognize that this inter-
ference may be privileged.7 The Michigan court finds its justification for the 
defendant's acts in section 774 of the Restatement of Torts.8 This section 
1 Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §445.151. 
.2 REI'oRT OF TIIE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY TIIE ANTITRUsr 
LAws 151 (1955). 
3 66 Stat. L. 631 (1952), 15 U.S.C. (1952) §45. The McGuire Act specifically exempts 
price fixing under fair trade nonsigner provisions from the federal antitrust laws, thus 
removing the objections raised in Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 
384, 71 S.Ct. 745 (1951). 
4 For the current status of the nonsigner provision in the forty-five states having fair 
trade acts, see 1 CCH TRADE REG. REP., 10th ed., 1[3258. The Michigan nonsigner pro• 
vision was declared unconstitutional in Shakespeare Co. v. Lippman's Tool Shop Sporting 
Goods Co., 334 Mich. 109, 54 N.W. (2d) 268 (1952). 
5 Shakespeare Co. v. Lippman's Tool Shop Sporting Goods Co., note 4 supra. 
6 4 TORTS REsTATEMENT §766 (1939); PROSSER, TORTS, 2d ed., 720 (1955). 
7 4 TORTS REsTATEMENT §767 (1939); PROSSER, TORTS, 2d ed., 735-738 (1955). 
8 Sunbeam Corp. v. Masters of Miami, Inc., (5th Cir. 1955) 225 F. (2d) 191, on almost 
identical facts, adopts the same basis for holding the defendant's interference privileged. 
It is clear that the defendant in this situation has no privilege based solely upon the public 
interest in free competition as he would if plaintiff had no existing contract. See Mogul 
Steamship Co. v. McGregor, Gow & Co., 23 Q.B.D. 598 (1889). Likewise, the defendant 
himself has no prior contract which would justify his preventing the performance of an-
other's contract which threatens his own. 'Williams v. Adams, 250 App. Div. 603, 295 N.Y.S. 
86 (1937). Nor does the defendant have a privilege of interference in the public interest, 
since this privilege is traditionally restricted to protection of the public health or morals. 
Legris v. Marcotte, 129 ill. App. 67 (1906); Brimelow v. Casson, [1924] 1 Ch. D. 302. 
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states that a defendant is privileged to induce the non-performance of a 
contract "the purpose or effect of which is to restrict his business oppor-
tunities in violation of a defined public policy."9 This privilege is not re-
stricted to contracts which are wholly void, but may exist even though the 
contract is enforceable between the contracting parties.10 If section 774 
is to be applied in the principal case, the only contracts to which it can 
refer are those between plaintiff and his distributors. Since the legislature 
has expressly given validity to such contracts by a provision of the fair 
trade act which the court has not heretofore questioned on constitutional 
grounds, it is difficult to view these contracts as "violative of a defined pub-
lic policy."11 The Michigan court, however, decided that although the con-
tract is not violative of public policy and is, therefore, enforceable as 
between the contracting parties, it is violative of public policy and unen-
forceable as to third parties. Aside from any consideration of ·the validity 
of such a distinction, it creates an anomalous result in these cases. The fair 
trader is left with contracts which he is told are "valid," but which he dis-
covers are quite worthless in his legal battle to enforce them against the 
price-cutting nonsigner. In partial defense of the Michigan court's deci-
sion, it should be noted that if the contract is not viewed as violative of pub-
lic policy in its application to non-contracting parties and if, therefore, 
no privilege is recognized, an equally anomalous result would be reached. 
The nonsigner could not constitutionally be prevented from selling below a 
price to which he had not agreed, but he could be prevented froin inter-
fering with fair trade agreements in his efforts to purchase at the reduced 
prices necessary to those sales. Although such a distinction between a 
person's selling and his purchasing, both contrary to the provisions of a 
fair trade agreement to which he is not a party, is justifiable in theory,12 
its practical effect is to permit enforcement of the fair trade acts against the 
nonsigner when the court has already determined that such a result is un-
constitutional. As noted at the outset, the effectiveness of the fair trade 
acts depends upon their nonsigner provisions. In the light of the anomalous 
results which follow when this fact is overlooked and an attempt is made 
to hold the acts valid as to contracting parties and invalid as to nonsigners, 
the courts would do well either to uphold or to overturn the acts in 
their entirety when first called upon to determine their validity. 
9 4 TORTS REsTATEMENT §774 (1939). 
10 Id., comment a. 
William R. J entes, S. Ed. 
11 Dissenting opinion in Sunbeam Corp. v. Masters of Miami, Inc., note 8 supra. 
Cf. Cook, "The Continuing Fair Trade Battle," 29 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 66 at 81 (1954). 
12 In Sunbeam Corp. v. Economy Distributing Co., (D.C. Mich. 1955) 131 F. Supp. 
791, it was argued that the distinction is not only justifiable in theory but also in practice 
since, in order to protect himself from the nonsigner, the fair trader must enter into fair 
trade agreements with all of his distributors rather than only one of them as is the case 
if the nonsigner provision_ of the acts is effective. 
